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Heise/Thieme: What happened to heterodox economics after the 1970s 
 
Abstract 
 
In the context of ongoing criticisms of the lack of pluralism in economics, the present 
article aims to discuss the development of ‘heterodox’ economics since the 1970s. 
Following Lakatos’s concept of scientific research programs (srp), and concentrating on 
the situation in Germany, the article will discuss classifications of economics, and will 
specify the understanding of diversity in the light of ‘axiomatic variations’ of the 
economic mainstream. This will form the basis for the subsequent description of the 
development of heterodoxy in Germany, with special reference to the founding of new 
universities and the reform movements in the 1970s. It can be shown that the heterodox 
scene flourished in this period, but that this pluralization remained fragmented and 
short-lived; by the 1980s at the latest heterodoxy was again on its way to 
marginalization. The history of heterodoxy in Germany thus presents itself as an 
unequal ‘battle of the paradigms,’ and can only be told as the story of a failure. 
 
 
Keywords:  Heterodox economics, pluralization, philosophy of science, sociology of  
science 
 
JEL code: A 11, B 20, B 50, Z 13  
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1. Introduction* 
 
In 1992 a group of economists published a ‘Plea for a Pluralistic and Rigorous 
Economics’ in the American Economic Review which was also signed by several Nobel 
laureates (including Franco Mogdiliani, Paul Samuelson and Jan Tinbergen). The text 
states: 
 
We the undersigned are concerned with the threat to economic science 
posed by intellectual monopoly. Economists today enforce a monopoly of 
method or core assumptions, often defended on no better ground than it 
constitutes the “mainstream.” Economists will advocate free competition, 
but will not practice it in the marketplace of ideas. Consequently, we call for 
a new spirit of pluralism in economics, involving critical conversation and 
tolerant communication between different approaches. Such pluralism 
should not undermine the standards of rigor; an economics that requires 
itself to face all the arguments will be a more, not a less, rigorous science. 
We believe that the new pluralism should be reflected in the character of 
scientific debate, in the range of contributions in its journals, and in the 
training and hiring of economists. (Abramovitz 1992) 
 
Although the ‘mainstream’ criticized here as an intellectual monopoly is not explicitly 
named, there is no doubt that the authors were alluding to the ‘dynamic stochastic 
general equilibrium model’ (DSGE), usually referred to as ‘neoclassical economics.’ 
This model not only provided the foundation for the vast majority of all research 
articles, but also constituted the canon in the widely used textbooks of (mainly) 
American authors (e.g. Mankiw’s Introduction to Economics and Samuelson/Nordhaus’ 
Economics). There are two interesting things about this ‘plea.’ Firstly, it asserts the 
dominance of a scientific paradigm in economics (‘intellectual monopoly’), though this 
is occasionally challenged with regard to numerous ‘axiomatic variations’.1 Secondly, it 
deplores this dominance, an attitude which is also not universally shared. Olivier 
Blanchard (2008), for example, quite recently described the state of economics as 
‘good,’ primarily because a consensus model had been successfully established within 
the DSGE paradigm. This seemed not only to settle the long-lasting quarrel between the 
‘Keynesians’ and the ‘neoclassical economists’, but also provided the basis for an 
economic policy allowing a historically unprecedented stability of growth (‘Great 
Moderation’; cf. Summers 2005). In the terms of the much-quoted philosopher of 
science Thomas Samuel Kuhn, a ‘normal science’ had developed, and economics had 
thus attained the status of a ‘mature’ science. According to this understanding, pluralism 
                                                 
* The present paper is in large part based on work carried out as part of a research project funded by the 
Hans Böckler Foundation, ‘Ökonomen und Ökonomie’, which is soon to be published: Heise et al. 
(2015). Thanks also go to Gerd Grözinger for his helpful comments. The late Fred Lee, former editor of 
The American Journal of Economics and Sociology, accompanied the project with great interest – it is 
to him that the article is dedicated. 
1
 Cf. especially Colander (2000) and Colander/Holt/Rosser (2004). 
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is a sign of immaturity or of a revolutionary paradigm shift within a science, while 
monism is a mark of maturity and ‘normality’ in the business of science. 
 
Since the last global financial crisis, everything has changed. The self-assurance of 
mainstream economics has gone: within the discipline, there are calls for changes,2 
while external critics ask why the crisis was not predicted, and why there are no ready-
made recipes for dealing with crises on the scale of the latest global financial crisis and 
the resulting European debt crisis.3 Critics are calling into question the universal 
validity of a paradigm that is ontologically defined by an optimistic faith in self-
regulation, and is almost completely fixated on allocative questions, instead of calling 
into question the conditions and risks of stability.4 Would economics not have been 
better served – and, of course, the national economies affected by the instability – if the 
scientific community had accorded more space, recognition and respect to those 
theorists who were suddenly ‘rediscovered’ after the crisis, to help to understand what 
had happened? These include the post-Keynesians Hyman P. Minsky and Wynne 
Godley, who can be categorized as heterodox, but also, of course, the primary theorist 
of instability and disequilibrium, John Maynard Keynes.5  
 
The aim here is not to argue for the pluralization of economics on the basis of the theory 
and philosophy of science;6  the plea for pluralization in 1992, just like numerous other 
                                                 
2
 Cf. amongst others Kirchgässner (2009), Blanchard/Del’Arricia/Mauro (2010), Caballero (2010), 
Galbraith (2013), Kirman (2010), Pessaran/Smith (2011), Stiglitz (2009a; 2009b; 2011; 2014).  
3
 Particular prominence was attained by the question the Queen of England put to her economists in the 
British Academy of Science: why, she asked, was there not sufficient warning of the global financial 
crisis? (cf. Besley/Hennessy 2009). But German Chancellor Angela Merkel expressed similar criticisms 
at the 5th Lindau conference of Nobel laureates in economics: “Now we are emerging from years in 
which – I want to say this very carefully, in such learned company – one hasn’t always had the 
impression that economics already knew about everything that was going to happen to us. Of course one 
can now ask why some of the things that we assumed in our statistics and prognoses – not just we as 
politicians, but also in highly expert organizations – were so far removed from the reality that then 
came about. (…)In any case one does not have the impression that the majority made the right 
prognoses.” (Merkel 2014; own translation). 
4
 Robert Lucas expressed this as follows in his ‘Presidential Address’ to the American Economic Asso-
ciation: “The question I have addressed in this lecture is whether stabilization policies that go beyond 
the general stabilization of spending that characterizes the last 50 years, whatever form they might take, 
promise important increases in welfare. The answer to this question is ‘No’: The potential gains from 
improved stabilization policies are on the order of hundredths of a percent of consumption, perhaps two 
orders of magnitude smaller than the potential benefits of available ‘supply-side’ fiscal reforms.” 
(Lucas 2003: 11). 
5
 Both Hyman P. Minsky and Wynne Godley – and John Maynard Keynes even more so – suddenly 
received a great deal of attention after the outbreak of the global financial crisis, attention that had never 
been paid to them before, except in the heterodox part of the community of economists; cf. e.g. 
Leijonhufvud (2009), Posner (2009), Skidelsky (2009), Sell (2010), Kurz (2011), Palley (2011), 
Heise/Hentrich (2012), Schlefer (2013). In 2011, Minsky’s works were published in German translation 
for the first time: Minsky (2011). 
6
 The list of studies dealing with this is long. To give a small selection: Davis (1994), Salanti/Screpanti 
(1997), Backhouse (2001), King (2002a), Kellert/Longino/Waters (2006), Heise (2007).  
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memoranda and appeals published by academics and students since then,7 is sufficient 
indication of the lack of plurality and the continued existence of a monistic consensus in 
the community of economists. Instead, the central question will be why the state of 
pluralization that was apparent in surveys of economists at the beginning of the 1980s,8 
after the universities in Germany had opened up to critical, heterodox approaches during 
the reforms and the founding of new universities from the mid-1960s, was not 
maintained or indeed expanded – e.g. when many faculties of economics were effective-
ly re-founded at the East German universities after German reunification in 1990.9 To 
do this, we need to briefly describe, in section 2, the concept of scientific plurality used 
here, in order to be able to distinguish between ‘axiomatic variation’ and ‘genuine 
plurality’. This will also allow us to categorize other terms often used in this context: 
‘mainstream’, ‘orthodoxy’, ‘dissenter’ and ‘heterodoxy’. In section 3 we trace the para-
digmatic development of economics in Germany (in light of the object of this study, 
pluralism), and its position in the universities, in the institutional context of changing 
structures of university governance. The focus, then, is exclusively on the academic 
discipline of economics, as represented by professorial positions at public universities.10 
In section 4 we will seek explanations for this development in a Bourdieuian analytical 
framework (cf. Bourdieu 1990; 1991). Section 5, finally, gives a brief conclusion. 
 
 
2. Plurality versus variation 
 
From a philosophy of science perspective, the concept of ‘plurality’ or ‘pluralism’ is 
opaque. Sometimes there is talk of a plurality of methods, sometimes of theoretical or 
paradigmatic pluralism. Following the concept of pluralism found in critical rationa-
lism, and the philosophy of science principles of the theorists of pluralism, Imre Lakatos 
(1974) and Paul Feyerabend (1975), plurality is to be understood here as a multitude of 
paradigms, in the sense of a ‘battle of the paradigms’ for a better interpretation or 
                                                 
7
 The list of relevant appeals is long. In 2011, Swiss lecturers and researchers went public with an appeal 
stating that ‘Research and teaching in economics, finance and management should be modernized, with 
the aim of better serving the common good’ (Auroi et al. 2011). In the same year, the ‘Baseler Manifest 
für ökonomische Aufklärung’ (Basel Manifesto for Economic Enlightenment) (Chesney et al. 2011) was 
published by the Centre for Religion, Economy and Politics in Basel. And in 2012 the MeM-Denkfabrik 
für Wirtschaftsethik published an appeal with the title ‘For a modernization of the economy’ (cf. 
Thielemann et al. 2012). There are also numerous appeals from students, such as the ‘Petition Autisme 
Economique’ in 2000, ‘opening up economics’ by the Cambridge 27 in 2001, and the latest appeal, ‘An 
international student call for pluralism in economics’ by the International Student Initiative for 
Pluralism in Economics (2014). 
8
 In a survey of academic economists in 1981, 54% stated that they were against neoclassical monism, 
while only 46% regarded this idea as reasonable (cf. Frey/Humbert/Schneider (2007)). 
9
 A new survey at the beginning of the 2000s showed that 80% of the economists surveyed now based 
their views on neoclassical economics – and these were significantly more young economists than old 
ones close to retirement (cf. Frey/Humbert/Schneider 2007). A similar development can also be 
observed for the USA, however; cf. Colander/Klamer (1987) und Klamer (2007: 230).  
10
 Private universities, the first of which were established in the mid-1980s, cannot be taken into 
consideration here. This is because of the limited access to reliable data, but also because of the 
completely marginal influence they have had so far in Germany. Universities of applied sciences 
(Fachhochschulen) are not examined because they are not authorized to award doctorates and therefore 
cannot contribute to the reproduction of scientific paradigms.  
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approximation of reality.11 Using Lakatos’s scientific research program (srp)12 as a 
frame of reference, the following dimensions of classification can be described: (cf. 
Tab. 1): 1) a particular methodology, which is regarded as acceptable (and therefore 
scientific); 2) in epistemological terms, it is possible to identify certain core assump-
tions (axioms) underlying the formation of models; 3) a ‘negative heuristic’, according 
to which the postulates of the research program, which have been derived from the core 
assumptions, are not (allowed to be) called into question.  
 
The DSGE mainstream – which is made up of new classical macroeconomics and neo-
Keynesianism13 – is unanimously based on the core assumptions that characterize the 
paradigm of social exchange theory. These are rationality, ergodicity and substitutiona-
lity (cf. Davidson 1984), the exclusive acceptance of a formal mathematical-deductive, 
positivist reductionism (cf. Lawson 2006). After the ‘empirical turn’ of the last two or 
three decades, these have been combined with sophisticated micro- and macroeconome-
trics, or with experimental arrangements (cf. Schmidt/ aus dem Moore 2010), such as 
are familiar from the leading natural sciences (physics and chemistry). The postulate of 
stability and optimality (Walras’s law), which is implemented a priori in the core 
assumptions, serves as a ‘model solution,’ and thus functions as a marker of a negative 
heuristic. The apparently very different model prognoses of new classical macroecono-
mics (hyper-balanced and hyper-stable) on the one hand, and of standard and neo-
Keynesianism (unbalanced, open to intervention) on the other hand are based on 
changes to assumptions in the ‘protective belt’ (e.g. about the speed of adjustment, the 
rigidity of prices and quantities, the formation of expectations etc.), but do not actually 
point to a different paradigmatic origin of the two schools of theory.14 
 
Criticism of the core assumptions of the mainstream is occasionally answered with the 
argument that these are still valid for the DSGE model used in education and training, 
but not for the model used in research. The latter, it is argued, has long since incorpo-
rated approaches from behavioral economics, neuroeconomics or the economics of 
complexity, and assumptions of, for example, limited rationality. Since the proponents 
                                                 
11
 Kapeller (2012: 107ff.) describes paradigms or economic models as ‘idealizations’, ‘fictions’, 
‘heuristics’ or ‘metaphors.’ 
12
 For the problems involved in translating Lakatos's concept to economics, see Cross (1982). For an 
overview of the discussion on the application of philosophy of science concepts to economics, see 
Drakopoulos/Karayiannis (2005). 
13
 Combining (neo-)Keynesian and neoclassical models in a single paradigm may sound strange to some 
readers, but will hopefully become plausible when discussed in more detail below. As Davidson (1992; 
2005) has shown, placing these in the same paradigm highlights the unsuitability of the use of the term 
‘Keynesian’ for neo-Keynesian models (which can thus be seen as fraudulent labeling). 
14
 Consequently, both approaches can be found in modern textbooks, with a distinction being made 
between short term (neo-Keynesian model) and long term (neoclassical model); cf. e.g. Abel/Bernanke 
(2005); Blanchard/Johnson  (2013). Especially noteworthy is information economics, which also shares 
the core assumptions and methodology of the mainstream, but nonetheless rejects the ideal of stability 
and optimality as a negative heuristic. This apparently inconsistent finding is not based on the proof of 
deductive weaknesses in the theoretical derivation of the postulates of stability and optimality, but in 
the special emphasis placed on the distribution of information to economic subjects (who are no longer 
permitted to be seen as representative agents). This is raised to the rank of a – divergent – core assump-
tion.   
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of these approaches – sometimes referred to as ‘dissenters’, sometimes as the ‘peri-
phery’ – accept the (often methodological) limitations of the mainstream, and (observ-
ing the ‘negative heuristic’) do not venture to voice any fundamental criticism of the 
mainstream as a ‘model solution’,15 they are recognized by the mainstream,16 and occa-
sionally even held up as the dynamic front line of mainstream research (cf. Colander/ 
Holt/Rosser 2009).17 The same does not apply to those dissenters within the mainstream 
who share its core axioms and the optimistic belief in stability and optimality, but not 
the methodological requirements of a rigorous formal deductivism. The economics of 
order (Ordnungsökonomik), but also the ‘Austrian school,’ based on the work of Hayek, 
are largely marginalized as worthy, but methodologically weak and no longer up-to-date 
(cf. Schmidt/aus dem Moore 2010, p. 170 ff.). 
 
                                                 
15
 ‘Loyalty’ to the mainstream is attested either by refusing to generalize the proof one has just given of 
the untenability of certain assumptions (mostly the assumption of rationality) (cf. Smith 2002, p. 505), 
or by explicitly stating that this is not an alternative to the dominant mainstream, but simply an addition 
(cf. e.g. Hermann-Pillath 2013: XVIII). 
16
 This means, primarily, that representatives of these approaches are able to publish their work in the ma-
jor mainstream journals (which are, in turn, part of the economic capital of a paradigm). 
17
 Both Kuhn’s ‘paradigm’ and Lakatos’s ‘scientific research programs’ are terminologically ambiguous. 
Here I wish to understand the concepts as efforts to explain the economy as a whole, in which all 
aspects of economics are embedded – theories of the labor market, distribution and growth, as well as 
theories of foreign trade, money or finance. From this perspective, however, it seems questionable 
whether, for example, behavioral economics or the economics of complexity actually constitute 
independent paradigms, or whether they are just partial theories, which may in some cases have 
connections to various paradigms. 
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Table 1: Classification  of economic paradigms 
Core 
assumptions 
Methodology Heuristic Paradigm Theoretical school 
- Assumption of 
rationality 
- Assumption of 
ergodicity 
- Assumption of 
substitutionality 
Formal mathe-
matical deduc-
tive, positivist 
reductionism + 
highly developed 
empiricism/ 
experimentalism 
Acceptance of 
the stability of 
market clearing 
as a ‘model 
solution’ 
DSGE - New classical 
macroeconomics 
- Neo-Keynesianism 
- Standard 
Keynesianism 
Questioning of 
some of the core 
assumptions 
Formal mathe-
matical deduc-
tive, positivist 
reductionism + 
highly developed 
empiricism/ 
experimentalism 
Acceptance of 
the stability of 
market clearing 
as a ‘model 
solution’ 
DSGE  
dissenters 
- Behavioral economics 
- Neuroeconomics 
- Economics of 
complexity 
- Evolutionary 
economics 
- Assumption of 
rationality 
- Assumption of 
ergodicity 
- Assumption of 
substitutionality 
Rejection of 
formal mathe-
matical deduc-
tive, positivist 
reductionism 
Acceptance of 
the stability of 
market clearing 
as a ‘model 
solution’ 
DSGE  
dissenters 
- Economics of order 
- Austrian school 
- Critical neoclassical 
economics 
- Assumption of 
rationality 
- Assumption of 
ergodicity 
- Assumption of 
substitutionality 
- Assumption of 
asymmetric 
distribution of 
information 
Formal mathe-
matical deduc-
tive, positivist 
reductionism + 
highly developed 
empiricism/ 
experimentalism 
Rejection of the 
stability of 
market clearing 
as a ‘model 
solution’ 
Dissenters/ 
heterodoxy 
- Information 
economics 
Questioning of 
some of the core 
assumptions 
Acceptance of 
formal mathe-
matical deduc-
tion + narrative 
analysis 
Rejection of the 
stability of 
market clearing 
as a ‘model 
solution’ 
Heterodoxy - Post-Keynesianism 
- Social economics/ 
social-economic 
institutionalism 
- Regulation theory/ 
Marxism 
- Historical school  
- Assumption of 
rationality 
- Assumption of 
ergodicity 
- Assumption of 
substitutionality 
 
Formal mathe-
matical deduc-
tive, positivist 
reductionism + 
highly developed 
empiricism/ 
experimentalism 
Rejection of the 
stability of 
market clearing 
as a ‘model 
solution’ 
Heterodoxy - Neo-Ricardianism 
 
Heterodoxy is characterized by the rejection of some (or all) of the mainstream axioms, 
methodological openness to less formal, narrative deductions and inductive techniques, 
and, consequently, the repudiation of the stability and optimality of the market coordi-
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nation solution (repudiation of Walras’s law18). Theoretical schools that can undoubted-
ly be regarded as heterodox include post-Keynesianism, neo-Marxist regulation theory, 
theories of social economy, and, if it has not already died out, the non-axiomatic histori-
cal school. Neo-Ricardianism, which goes back to Piero Sraffa, also conceives itself as 
heterodox, since its proponents reject the mainstream postulate of stability and optima-
lity, while nonetheless accepting the research methodology and core axioms of the 
mainstream. This apparently inconsistent result can be explained by the fact that the 
neo-Ricardians, in the so-called Cambridge Capital Controversy (CCC), provided the 
proof that the stable equilibrium solutions based on the core assumptions of the DSGE 
mainstream, which are also shared (or at least not called into question) by the neo-
Ricardians, are only valid in very limited circumstances.19 In short, this rocked the 
entire deductive foundation of the mainstream – but without offering any plausible 
alternative. 
 
The dual classification into orthodoxy/mainstream and heterodoxy/non-mainstream has 
the advantage of allowing clear distinctions between model-theory-based variations 
within a paradigm (i.e. intraparadigmatic plurality, which can also encompass the so-
called ‘dissenters’) and interparadigmatic plurality. Heuristics turn out to be a key point 
of differentiation: only those models and theories that do not question the heuristic of 
the DSGE – i.e. the postulate of stability manifested in Walras’s law as a ‘model solu-
tion’ – are orthodox/mainstream or are accepted by the mainstream, and only those 
models and theories that explicitly reject this heuristic can be regarded as heterodox/ 
non-mainstream. In this sense, real plurality, in contrast to ‘axiomatic variation,’ means 
the acceptance of all heuristics – orthodox and heterodox – that are based on rigorous 
modeling, which can be intersubjectively reconstructed and empirically falsified. 
 
 
3. Development of economics in West Germany after 1945  
 
With Hesse (2007; 2010), we can observe that economics and business studies were 
subject to multiple layers of development at German universities in the post-war years:  
a) The number of students of Wirtschaftswissenschaften (economics + business 
studies) exploded from around 9,000 in 1950 to 31,000 in 1965 (= + 244%), then 
to 52,000 in the 1974/75 winter semester (= + 68%).20 To begin with, the 
number of professors did not keep pace, rising only from 54 in 1950 to 78 in 
1960 (= + 44%). With the wave of new institutions being founded, however, this 
                                                 
18
 The insight that a real paradigmatic alternative implies the rejection of Walras’s law goes back to 
Robert Clower (1965). But even before that, ‘heterodox’ economists such as Karl Marx or Thomas 
Robert Malthus had begun to question the classical predecessor of Walras’s law, Say’s law; for the re-
lationship between Walras’s law and Say’s law, see Mishan (1963). 
19
 One would have to either live in a one-commodity world (such as Ricardo’s corn economy), or make 
specific assumptions about the capital intensity of the subsistence commodity industry and all of its 
input producers – neither of which is especially realistic. 
20
 Due to a change in the classification system in 1972, the student numbers are not completely compa-
rable over time.   
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number also rose dramatically by the mid-1970s, to 243 (= + 211%). “From the 
end of the 1960s, the market for economists eligible to be appointed as 
professors was virtually swept clean, due to the generational changeover and 
the simultaneous expansion of the universities, and Privatdozenten21  had an 
astonishingly powerful position in the market – especially in young and 
fashionable subjects such as econometrics and economic theory.” (Hesse 2007: 
125; own translation). From the mid-1970s, this picture changed dramatically – 
access for young academics was now more or less blocked until around the end 
of the 1990s.22 
b) The formalization and mathematization of the discipline was accompanied by a 
methodological and epistemological ‘professionalization’, which was meant to 
allow economics to rise to the rank of a Leitwissenschaft or leading science (at 
least among the social sciences) (cf. e.g. Schipper 2013). Since this process was 
mainly driven by the US, the new scientific hegemon, it is often referred to as 
‘Americanization’. However, in view of the efforts of German economists to 
catch up with developments that had been missed during the Nazi period 
(especially the younger generation, most of whom had been trained in the US), it 
can also be understood at least in part as a process of ‘self-Americanization’ (cf. 
Hesse 2007: 128f.; Rosser/Holt/Colander 2010: 8). 
c) Separation of economics from legal studies (previously combined in faculties of 
Staatswissenschaften, literally ‘state sciences’), and internal specialization 
within economics faculties. 
 
The aspect of professionalization, in conjunction with self-Americanization, requires 
further attention here. On the one hand, this reflects the largely normal development of a 
science from the pre-paradigmatic stage to that of a ‘mature’ science (cf. Kuhn 1970: 
256ff.). On the other hand, however, professionalization also refers here to the transition 
from an evaluative normativism (‘advocacy’) to a (supposedly) objective positivism 
(‘objectivity’) – especially in light of the ongoing development of empirical testing 
methods, and the emergence of econometrics. The driving force of this development 
originally lay in the US, in the attempt to gain legitimation and acceptance for an acade-
mic discipline that was still in its infancy. Since – in contrast to Europe and in particular 
Germany – it was not the institution of the university that give the discipline or its re-
presentatives the necessary legitimation, generally accepted scientific criteria such as 
rigor and epistemological exactness had to be borrowed from other, successful disci-
plines (‘leading sciences’) – especially, of course, the natural sciences (cf. Busch 1959: 
80ff.; Mirowski 1989). Thus formalization, axiomatization, and empirical monitoring 
were taken as the methodological and epistemological boundaries of what was legitima-
                                                 
21
 So-called ‘private lecturers,’ i.e. academics with a Habilitation and the right to teach and supervise 
doctorates, but no salaried position. 
22
 During the wave of foundation of new institutions, around 70 per cent of Assistenten (research 
assistants/ junior researchers) had a chance of gaining a professorship. Once these new institutions had 
been founded, from the mid-1970s, only 9 per cent of them had this chance; cf. Finkenstaedt (2010: 
157).  
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tely allowed to call itself economics.23 Since, however, the process of knowledge 
acquisition is culturally bound, professionalization also implies a heuristic demarcation 
of boundaries: the special social position of the market as an instrument of coordination 
and a meritocratic justification for economic distribution outcomes in the US meant that 
an academic discipline hoping to gain social acceptance could not afford to funda-
mentally challenge the superiority of the market over other mechanisms of coordination 
and distribution (cf. Fourcade 2009: 35ff., 78ff.).24 The equilibrium and welfare econo-
mics developing at the end of the 19th century, based on the work of Jevons, Menger, 
Walras and Pareto, increasingly replaced American institutionalism as the dominant 
paradigm in US economics. Although the German university as an institution, and the 
professor as a ‘mandarin’, had lost much of their authority after the experiences of the 
Nazi period, and were subjected to further challenges, especially during the student 
movement, the phenomenon of ‘self-Americanization’ is probably to be ascribed more 
to German economists’ feelings of inferiority in the international context25 than to any 
urgent need to acquire legitimacy in the national social and political arena.26 What 
happened, then, was an importing of norms which had no cultural basis in Germany – 
but which are defended, to this day, by those scholars who reject the idea of greater 
methodological openness.27 Astonishingly, the argument given is that specific national 
approaches (nationale Sonderwege) would undermine the international competitiveness 
of German economists. 
 
Although the theoretical foundations of equilibrium and welfare economics were laid in 
the second half of the 19th century, and came to occupy a dominant position in Great 
Britain,28 it is nonetheless the period after the Second World War that has to be seen as 
the real phase of professionalization of economics, in the sense used above – and in 
both politics and academia, this phase was mainly dominated by one economist: John 
Maynard Keynes (cf. Solow 1986; Snowdon/Vane 1997). The construction of macro-
economic theories on the basis of Keynes’s magnum opus – the General Theory 
                                                 
23
 “In contrast with their European counterparts, whose elite situation was a ‘given,’ grounded in history, 
class, and (for continental Europe) state patronage, American university professors had to conquer 
their own legitimacy and social standing in a culture that had never been strongly deferential to 
intellectual authority, and they relied on professionalization in order to accomplish that goal.” 
(Fourcade-Gourinchas 2001: 426).  
24
 An American business journalist sums it up neatly: “To be an economist in the United States, you have 
to believe that the market works most of the time. The situation in which markets don’t work, or cannot 
be made to work, is really quite exceptional, and not all that interesting to study.” (Fourcade 2009: 61). 
25
 Hesse (2010: 320ff.) refers to a large number of sources that show these feelings of inferiority, thus 
suggesting that Americanization was part of a semantics of progress.   
26
 The German ‘economics of order’ (Ordnungsökonomik), which still resists the claims to axiomatization 
and formalization made by mainstream economics, was quite influential in the early phase of West 
Germany history (cf. among others Ptak 2004: 155ff.).  
27
 Rosser/Holt/Colander (2010: 18) bemoan this US-centeredness as a source of second-class imitation 
rather than first-class innovation. 
28
 This is due, in particular, to the position of Alfred Marshall and Arthur Cecil Pigous at one of the 
world’s foremost elite universities at the time. Thus there was already talk of ‘orthodoxy’ (cf. Keynes 
1936: V) or of a ‘citadelle’ (cf. Keynes 1934: 488) in the first quarter of the 20th century. 
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(Keynes 1936) – left room not only for formalization and econometric expansion,29 but 
also for appropriation by the (neo-)classical orthodoxy which Keynes had criticized.30 
Keynesian principles of economic management also allowed a promising combination 
of scientific objectivity and added value for society. The sentence ascribed to Paul 
Samuelson, “We are all Keynesians now”, was roughly applicable to West Germany in 
the 1960s, where just over two thirds of the available professorships had been filled, 
even straight after the war, by academics who had completed their Habilitation either 
after 1945 (one third) or between 1933 and 1945 (another third) (cf. Hesse 2010: 191). 
The 1960s, however, saw the beginning of a process that would intensify in the 1970s, 
the struggle for paradigmatic supremacy – the second phase in the maturation process of 
economics, in the sense of the contested emergence of a ‘normal science’. On the one 
hand, the voices questioning the neoclassical synthesis as the standard interpretation of 
Keynesianism were growing louder; these critics saw it instead as a ‘bastard Keynesia-
nism’ (Joan Robinson), which could not claim to give an accurate rendering of 
Keynesian macroeconomics. On the other hand, the Italian economist Piero Sraffa, a 
member of the circle surrounding Keynes, had published a slim volume in 1960 (Sraffa 
1960), which dealt a severe blow to neoclassical equilibrium economics. He did this by 
pointing out deductive inconsistences in the central argumentative field of neoclassical 
economics (and of the neoclassical synthesis): the price-based mechanism of equilibri-
um undoubtedly only works under unrealistic conditions. For the acceptance of a para-
digm in a science that lays claim to exactness and rigor as its basis for legitimation, 
deductive weaknesses had to be fatal.31 In addition to this, Sraffa set out to remedy the 
central weakness of classical political economy – the objective theory of value – with 
the formally exact description of an invariant measure of value. This led to a renais-
sance of classical political economy of Ricardian, but also Marxist provenance, whose 
proponents criticized not only the theoretical weaknesses of neoclassical equilibrium 
economics, but also its tenuous link with reality.32 
 
                                                 
29
 In the US, Lawrence Klein was arguably one of the most important exponents of the combination of 
econometrics and Keynesian macroeconomics. 
30
 John Hicks’ well-known IS-LM model can be seen as formalizing Keynesianism and reconciling it with 
neoclassical orthodoxy. Paul A. Samuelson eventually became the most prominent and influential 
representative of this “neoclassical synthesis”, the harmonization of Keynes and neoclassical theory, in 
the US. In Germany, this version of Keynesianism was mainly propagated by Erich Schneider, Erich 
Preiser, Fritz Neumark and Karl Schiller. 
31
 The ‘fightback’ against the alleged theoretical falsification, in defense of the embattled neoclassical po-
sition, was initially led by Paul A. Samuelson and Robert Solow, later by Christopher Bliss and Frank 
Hahn. Although they had to acknowledge the validity of the criticism put forward by Sraffa, they were 
so successful in downplaying the significance of this controversy for the rigor of neoclassical equilibri-
um theory that Sraffa is now not even mentioned in studies on the development of modern macro-
economics, let alone in standard textbooks; cf. Cohen/Hartcourt (2003).    
32
 Vogt (1973: 12; own translation) gives the following account of the criticisms expressed at the time: 
“In its simplest version, the criticism is that the theory is not concerned with reality at all, but only with 
the development of its primarily mathematical methods and models, that it is fundamentally unable to 
be falsified, or that it has long since been falsified, and that it therefore not only compromises practice-
oriented education and training, but also impedes any genuine scientific progress; indeed its own 
development is a constant step backwards for science.”   
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Max Planck (1928: 22) argued that new scientific insights do not become widely accept-
ed because the proponents of the old paradigm change their minds, but because they 
grow old and disappear, and because the next generation of scholars are familiar with 
the new paradigm. In keeping with this, the sudden increase in chairs and professorships 
during the wave of new universities, and the not-yet completed generational changeover 
in the existing (‘old’) universities, can be seen as an institutional starting point for a po-
tential pluralization of economics in Germany. At first glance, the reform of the German 
higher education landscape taking place at the same time as the ‘battle of the paradigms’ 
had more to do with organizational structures and educational objectives. On the level 
of economics faculties or departments, however, ideas of reform relating to socio-
political orientation can certainly be linked with a type of economics that saw itself as 
an alternative to neoclassical equilibrium economics, even in its standard Keynesian 
version, or which at least called for pluralistic openness in the ‘battle of the paradigms.’ 
 
In the founding phase of new universities in the 1960s and 1970s, a paradigmatic 
opening-up of economics, quickly institutionalized with the founding of working 
groups33 and journals,34 coincided with the organizational opening-up of universities, 
especially certain “reform” universities (Reformuniversitäten), which created space to 
consolidate the process of pluralization by appointing professors. Due to high demand 
for professorial candidates, which the existing supply of habilitierte Privatdozenten 
could not even come close to meeting,35 the elite system ‘university’ temporarily 
opened up. Recruitment practices based on habit and social structures were replaced by 
practices based on science and research policy,36 particularly in those universities that 
had been founded as part of a movement to reform society, but also in universities – 
even traditional ones – where representatives of the students or research assistants had 
substantial involvement in decision-making, thanks to the short-lived principle of 
Drittelparität (one-third parity) in the governing bodies of the university. The university 
system at the beginning of the 1970s can be roughly divided into the following 
categories:37 1) traditional old universities with little likelihood of pluralization, 2) old 
universities where reform-oriented status groups have a strong influence; low to medi-
um likelihood of pluralization, 3) newly founded universities, designed to relieve pres-
                                                 
33
 At the beginning of the 1970s, for example, the Arbeitsgruppe Alternative Wirtschaftspolitik (Working 
Group for Alternative Economic Policy, also referred to as the ‘Memogruppe’) and the Arbeitskreis 
Politische Ökonomie (AK PolÖK, Working Group for Political Economy) were founded, as were 
numerous local ‘Rote Zellen Ökonomie’ (Red Cells for Economics).  
34
 Numerous economics and social science journals with pluralistic or ‘critical’ aspirations were estab-
lished, including Mehrwert – Beiträge zur Kritik der Politische Ökonomie; Prokla – Probleme des 
Klassenkampfes; Hefte für Politische Ökonomie; Das Argument; Leviathan – Zeitschrift für Sozial-
wissenschaft. 
35
 In the mid-1970s, around one fifth of all university professors had not completed a Habilitation; (cf. 
Hesse 2007: 124).  
36
 Cf. von der Vring (1975: 113 and 262), Gräfing (2012: 72ff.). What occasionally happened, however 
(at the University of Bielefeld, for example), was that other humanities faculties intervened in the 
recruitment process for individual chairs in economics, under the slogan of ‘interdisciplinarity.’ This 
probably led to a different orientation than would have been the case if only economists had been 
involved.  
37
 For more on this and on the coding of the university types and their likelihood of pluralization, see 
Heise et al. (2015: 293ff.). 
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sure on existing universities, no aspirations to reform; low likelihood of pluralization, 4) 
newly founded universities based on Humboldt’s ideal38, low likelihood of pluraliza-
tion, 5) newly founded universities with aspirations to reform in relation to social open-
ness and practical relevance; medium likelihood of pluralization, and 6) newly founded 
universities with aspirations to socio-political reform; high likelihood of pluralization 
(cf. Tab. 2). 
 
Table 2: University status and likelihood of pluralization to be expected 
 Classification Likelihood of pluralization 
1 Traditional ‘old university’ low 
2 Old universities strongly influenced by reform-oriented 
status groups  low-medium 
3 Newly founded universities, designed to relieve pressure on 
existing universities, no reform aspirations low 
4 Newly founded universities based on Humboldt’s ideal low 
5 Newly founded universities with aspirations to reform in 
relation to social openness and practical relevance medium 
6 Newly founded universities with aspirations to socio-political reform high 
 
The upshot of this is that we cannot expect any nationwide pluralization of economics 
as an academic discipline in Germany, but a heterogenization of both the access routes 
and the paradigmatic orientation of the professorships, with considerable regional varia-
tion. This, but also the bypassing of the Habilitation as the normal path to a professor-
ship,39 temporarily made it impossible to close the elite system of the university ‘from 
below’, i.e. with a qualification requirement monitored by the system itself. This led to 
pressure for standardization, linking recruitment to self-determined standards. Whether 
this form of closing the system ‘from above’ reproduces the heterogeneity which is to 
be expected, perhaps even extending it spatially, or whether it instead leads back to a 
broad paradigmatic homogeneity, depends very much on the developments on the 
‘battlefield of the paradigms’. It also depends, of course, on the range of possible 
dispositions in the field of power of ‘economics’. The battlefield of the paradigms saw a 
wave of further developments of orthodoxy: from monetarism and new classical macro-
economics to neo-Keynesian modeling and, finally, the new neoclassical synthesis. 
Alongside this, however, a few ‘dissenters’ also emerged, variations on the neo-
classical mainstream, who differed from the mainstream in their epistemology, but not 
in their methods or heuristics: neo-Austrian, neo-Schumpeterian and neo-institutionalist 
theories. Heterodoxy, the non-mainstream, developed various post-Keynesian and left-
                                                 
38
 The University of Bielefeld and Konstanz University were founded with the explicit objective to create 
small-sized, research-oriented ‘elite’ universities adopting the ideals of 19th century German university 
reformer Wilhelm von Humboldt. 
39
 On the one hand, this is a unique feature of the German-language university system, which is not 
internationally relevant. On the other hand, alternative recruitment paths via junior professorships and 
so-called ‘tenure-track’ systems have not yet been able to make any great headway against the path 
dependencies of tradition; cf. Bloch/Burkhardt (2011).  
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Keynesian positions,40 neo-Marxist theories such as the (French) regulation school or 
the (American) ‘social structure of accumulation’ approach. In Germany, however, the 
latter received little attention, and no professorial backing within economics depart-
ments.41 In his history of post-Keynesian economics, John King (2002: 140) claims that 
there was no significant group of post-Keynesian economists in Germany, but that 
“…neoclassical orthodoxy rules…”. Fred Lee (2009), in his history of heterodox 
economics, also comes to the conclusion that – in terms of the number of heterodox 
economists – Germany plays a fairly unimportant role both internationally and in 
Europe. The following sections will investigate the reasons for this. 
 
 
4. The marginalization of heterodoxy after 1970  
 
At the end of the 1960s, many economists (especially younger ones) felt that their 
discipline was in a crisis, and therefore believed that they were on the verge of a scien-
tific revolution. Their point of reference here was the frequently quoted text by the 
philosopher of science Thomas S. Kuhn (cf. Kuhn 1962). Such an ‘attack’ on the 
‘dominant economics’42 was only possible because of the efforts made over the pre-
vious two decades to ‘mature’ economics into a paradigmatic science. Its microecono-
mic core in general equilibrium theory had been decisively summarized by Kenneth 
Arrow, Gerard Debreu and Frank Hahn, and its macroeconomic superstructure de-
scribed theories of economic cycles and growth with a standard Keynesian focus. The 
massive expansion of the university system in Germany from the mid-1960s seemed to 
offer the chance to achieve a paradigm shift without waiting for the generational 
changeover which Max Planck had seen as the precondition for such cases. Instead it 
seemed possible to bring about a faster transition to the new paradigm by recruiting the 
younger generation, “which is familiar with the truth from the start” (Planck 1928: 22; 
own translation). The reliance on Kuhn, however, seems unfortunate. On the one hand, 
this is because the ‘empirical anomaly’ – the major economic crisis of the 1930s, as the 
basis of a state of crisis – was already so long ago that collective memory in the middle 
of the ‘golden age of capitalism’ had long since suppressed it. On the other hand, the 
‘logical anomaly’ – the evidence of theoretical inconsistency provided in the framework 
of the Cambridge Capital Controversy – could not fulfill the conditions of a constructive 
alternative which Kuhn had seen as necessary to trigger a paradigm shift. Hence Imre 
Lakatos’s concept of competing ‘scientific research programs’ seems better suited to 
examining the development of economics in general and heterodox economics in 
particular. This is especially true if one insists, like Paul Feyerabend, that this ‘battle-
field’ – at least in the social sciences – cannot be objectively divided into ‘progressive’ 
and ‘degenerate’ research programs, and that paradigmatic plurality (‘anything goes’) 
                                                 
40
 For a more exact description of the heterodox research programs in Germany, see Heise (2010: 36f.). 
41
 If at all these paradigms were represented in social science faculties or departments (e.g. at the 
University of Frankfurt). 
42
 An edited volume in which these attacks were collected had the subtitle ‘Zur Kritik der herrschenden 
Nationalökonomie’ (‘On the criticism of the dominant economics’) (cf. Vogt 1973). 
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should be allowed. From such a perspective, the ‘field of power’ in which the battle of 
the paradigms is fought becomes particularly important: to borrow from Pierre 
Bourdieu’s field theory, a paradigmatic development would then not be tied to objective 
(Kuhn) or objectifiable criteria (Lakatos), but would mainly depend on the actors’ en-
dowment with or access to economic, social, cultural and symbolic capital. 
 
The next step will be to show that the hope of a broad opening up of theoretical 
approaches, or a paradigmatic change in what was from then on to be understood as 
‘dominant economics’ (mainstream, normal science), was not able to be fulfilled even 
after the quantitative expansion and the substantive reform of the German university 
system from the mid-1960s.43 Instead, the old universities largely closed themselves to 
this pluralization despite the generational changeover and the quantitative expansion – 
except in those cases where there were effective promoters such as active student bodies 
and representatives of the Mittelbau (non-tenured academic staff), who, with the institu-
tional support of the short-lived system of Drittelparität (one-third parity), influenced 
the way professors were recruited. The example of the University of Bonn shows that 
recruiters were willing to put up with longer vacancies or a certain fluctuation, in order 
to restrict intake to those (junior) researchers who conformed to the disciplinary culture 
that was developing there at the time (mathematization). The result was an extremely 
unequal pluralization of economics at German universities (cf. the following Tab. 3 and 
Figure 1). At traditional old universities and at those new universities that had been 
founded solely to expand capacity, and were largely without aspirations to reform, hete-
rodox economists could only be appointed by chance, or these scholars only developed 
a heterodox orientation after their appointment. The chances of pluralism were some-
what higher when the relevant promoters encountered a ‘culture of openness’, internal 
organizational democracy, and external political support, as for example at the Univer-
sity of Frankfurt, where a chair in ‘Marxist economic theory’ was even established, or at 
the FU Berlin, where several heterodox professors were appointed.  
 
                                                 
43
 The following statements are based on a comprehensive survey of all economics professors classified 
as ‘heterodox’ at economics departments or faculties in German universities, and on a comparison 
between a selected heterodox economics department (University of Bremen) and an orthodox one 
(University of Bonn); cf. Heise at al. (2015).  
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Table 3: Relative frequency of heterodox economists 
Classification Locations (number) 
Heterodox 
economists 
(number) 
Heterodox 
economists  
per location 
Not classified (traditional old university) 43 13 0.3 
Newly founded university based on Humboldt’s ideal 2 4 2 
New university founded to relieve pressure on existing 
institutions, no aspirations to reform 12 1 0.1 
Old university strongly influenced by groups with 
socio-political orientation 6 8 1.3 
Newly founded university with aspirations to reform in 
relation to social openness and practical relevance 8 12 1.5 
Newly founded university with aspirations to reform in 
relation to socio-political orientation 2 15 7.5 
∑ 73 53  
Average   0.8 
 
At the ‘comprehensive universities’ (Gesamthochschulen44) in North Rhine-Westphalia 
and Hesse, which saw themselves as ‘reform’ universities with a focus on practical rele-
vance, professorial recruitment policies could allow heterodox economists to be taken 
into consideration – depending on specific local circumstances such as the position of 
the founding dean and the personnel policies at the predecessor institutions. The crucial 
factor here was the expectation that those economists who stood for (social) reforms and 
practical relevance – i.e. critical or heterodox economists – could be better for a reform 
university than those economists who stood for the preservation of the traditional uni-
versity model with its claims to value-neutral science – i.e. the mainstream economists. 
At the two reform universities with socio-political aspirations – the University of 
Bremen and the Hochschule für Wirtschaft und Politik (HWP) in Hamburg – these 
aspects came together in a way that was particularly favorable for pluralism, and thus 
permitted the emergence of two bastions of heterodoxy. 
                                                 
44
 The German system of higher education falls under federal authority, i.e. in the political realm of the 
German Bundesländer. Some Bundesländer – namely those ruled by social-democratic governments at 
the time – experimented with a new form of higher education institution: the ‘comprehensive univer-
sity’ which combined academic units of university status with academic units of ‘Fachhochschul’ status 
(‘universities of applied science’ which are the German pendant to British polytechnics and US liberal 
arts colleges).  
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Figure 1: Distribution of heterodox economists in the university field 
 
Source: Own calculations 
 
Figure 2: Professorial appointments of heterodox economists 1950 to 2013 
 
 
 
Notes: Habil. = Habilitation (see footnote 21); Apl. = außerplanmäßige (extra-ordinary, non-
tenured) professorships; TR = Transformation professorships, resulting from the fusion of 
universities of applied science and universities (see footnote 46) 
Source: Own representation 
 
At three quarters of all German universities with economics faculties or departments, 
then, heterodox economists were virtually unrepresented; of the remaining quarter, 
nearly 30% are to be found in the two ‘bastions’ of heterodoxy (Bremen and HWP). 
The pluralization is not only extremely unequal but quantitatively limited: at no point in 
time could more than 10% of economics professors at German universities be classified 
Heise/Thieme: What happened to heterodox economics after the 1970s 
17 
 
as belonging to the heterodox camp. And the development over time only tells a story of 
further marginalization (cf. Fig. 2): The number of appointments of heterodox econo-
mists after the 1970s declined rapidly,45 and as the ‘first generation’ grows old and 
retires, their numbers are shrinking more and more. At the same time, heterodox econo-
mists were completely overlooked when the economics faculties of East German 
universities were effectively re-founded after the German reunification in the early 
1990s (cf. Tab. 4).46 And finally, of the two bastions of heterodox economics (Bremen 
and HWP), one was practically shut down as a unit for teaching undergraduate eco-
nomics, and the other was adapted to the mainstream by being converted into another 
organizational unit after the generational changeover. 
 
Table 4: Economics professors at East German universities after the faculties were 
newly founded 
 Founding dean  
(disciplinary origin) 
Number of 
economics profs. 
(today) 
Number of heterodox 
economics profs.  
(per location) 
HU Berlin Wilhelm Krelle (economics) 9 - 
TU Chemnitz Peter Rüdger Wossidlo  (business informatics) 4 1 
BTU Cottbus/ 
Senftenberg 
Gerhard Duelen  
(business informatics) 4 1 
TU Dresden Wolfgang Blum (economics) 7 - 
U Erfurt Wolfgang Schluchter (sociology) 7 1 
EVU 
Frankfurt/Oder Joachim Starbatty (economics) 7 - 
U Greifswald Jürgen Regge (law) 4 - 
U Halle Alfred Schmitt-Rink (economics) 8 - 
U Jena Peter Oberender (economics) 6 - 
U Leipzig Gernot Gutmann (economics)/  
Bert Rürup (economics) 7 1 
TU Magdeburg Alois Wenig (economics) 6 - 
U Potsdam Josef Molsberger (economics)/ Wilhelm Bürklin (political science) 5 - 
U Rostock Dieter Oberndörfer  (political science) 6 - 
Total: 13  80 4 (0.3) 
Source: Websites of the relevant faculties; data from July 2014 
                                                 
45
 The 1990s should not be interpreted as an ‘interim high’; instead they hint at the quantitative extent of 
‘accidental’ appointments. The low number of heterodox appointments in the 1980s is due to the high 
degree of saturation of the university market after the wave of new universities had been founded.  
46
 Three of the four heterodox professors at East German universities did not go through the normal 
appointment procedures, but are außerplanmäßige Professoren (professorial title which universities 
may bestow on academics who have suitable qualifications for a professorship but are not actually 
employed as such) or arrived at their function when a university of applied science (Fachhochschule) 
fused with a university (or was transformed into a university).  
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This story of failure must, however, be read with reference to the dispositifs of the field 
of power. The community of economists exerted an enormous pressure to conform on 
their heterodox colleagues: for many years, the universities at which most of them were 
employed were denied membership of the Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft (DFG)47, 
and heterodox economists never held influential positions within the decision-making 
bodies of the DFG. Together these two things substantially reduced their economic, 
social and symbolic capital. The latter is also reflected in the fact that heterodox econo-
mists – predictably – have poor chances of obtaining funding from the DFG, and are 
thus dependent on alternative external sources (e.g. the Hans Böckler Foundation)48. 
Many heterodox economists have submitted research proposals to the DFG, but their 
chance of success is low, or in any case lower than for applications to alternative re-
search funding institutions (cf. Tab. 5): According to our survey, only 17% of DFG 
applications by heterodox economists were fully approved, as opposed to 57% of 
applications to alternative institutions. 50% of all applications to the DFG were com-
pletely rejected, but only 7% of applications to alternative external sources. This means 
that critical research – in the sense of ‘heterodox’ – can only really be achieved by 
means of such alternative external sources of funding. 
 
Table 5: Research funding of heterodox economists 
Institution Applied for funds (in %) Approved (in %) 
 
Yes No 0 < 50% >50% All 
DFG 60 40 50 25 8 17 
Alternative external 
sources 
75 25 7 7 29 57 
Source: Own calculations based on Heise et al. (2015) 
 
Of particular importance for the reproducibility of a scientific paradigm is the 
‘production’ of disciples, i.e. the number of doctorates and Habilitationen which are 
successfully completed during the tenure of a professorship, creating the potential to 
recruit the next cohort of professors. Although it is also fundamentally possible to 
complete one’s doctorate or Habilitation as an external scholar, the financial and human 
resources of an academic unit (faculty, department, institute or chair) are still the most 
significant parameter of reproducibility. This category of ‘economic capital’ was a 
further area in which the heterodox economists were not on an equal footing with the re-
presentatives of the mainstream – and this is vividly illustrated by a comparison bet-
ween the two strongholds of orthodoxy and heterodoxy, the universities of Bonn and 
                                                 
47
 The Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft (DFG) is the major publically funded, self-governing organisa-
tion for science and research in Germany. 
48
 The Hans-Böckler-Foundation is a Trade Union related organisation which supports science, research 
and co-determinantion. 
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Bremen.49 On the one hand, those reform universities where heterodox economists were 
most likely to be found had far fewer resources than the traditional ‘professorial’ uni-
versities (Ordinarienuniversitäten).50 On the other hand, in places where heterodox eco-
nomists had access to comparable resources (e.g. in the case of the University of Biele-
feld), ‘production’ of disciples was made difficult, at least at the level of the Habilita-
tion. And even at those locations where reproduction was successful as far as the 
Habilitation – at old and comparatively well-resourced universities such as the Univer-
sity of Frankfurt or the FU Berlin –, those who had gained their Habilitation seldom 
achieved the breakthrough to a regular professorship. Such scholars have often chosen 
alternative strategies: emigrating, moving into professorships at universities of applied 
science, or even shifting to other departments (sociology, political science). It is there-
fore certainly not false to speak of a disciplinary ‘brain drain’ in heterodox economics, 
which obviously weakens the position of heterodoxy within economics as a whole. This 
weakening is all the more dramatic because a return to the field of economics in 
Germany seems doubtful in cases of migration to other countries or other – neighboring 
– disciplines. 
 
Lastly, the heterodox economists quickly began networking at the beginning of the 
1970s,51 but they never succeeded in using these networks as a base for penetrating the 
reviewer networks of the DFG. True, a number of heterodox economists are involved in 
the Verein für Socialpolitik (VfS, Social Policy Association)52, especially in the 
committees for evolutionary economics and the history of economic thought. Outside 
these committees, however, their involvement within the VfS is minimal. And symbolic 
capital, the assumption of important and therefore symbolic positions in scientific, 
                                                 
49
 Despite limited information, it can be stated that fewer than 10 junior researchers received their Habili-
tation in economics at the economics department of the University of Bremen in the period from 1971 
to 2014. In the substantially shorter period from 1984 to 2014, more than three times as many eco-
nomists (over 30 of them) completed a Habilitation at the University of Bonn, and most of these went 
on to obtain a professorship at a German university. This goes for fewer than half of those who did 
their Habilitation in Bremen.  
50
 At the University of Bremen, for example, one of the elements of reform was to reduce the dependency 
of junior researchers on the chairs or professors. Sometimes professors were not given any post-
graduate or postdoctoral research staff (wissenschaftliche Mitarbeiter or Assistenten) at all. It was not 
until the mid-1980s that a turnaround in staffing policy occurred and the (mainly heterodox) professors 
were granted a small number of positions for research staff. According to the Statistisches Bundesamt, 
professors of economics in Germany had an average of 3.71 postgraduate and postdoctoral research 
staff in 2011 (cf. Stabu 2012: 96). Our survey of heterodox professors in Germany found an average of 
2.32 research staff. The discrepancy evident here in the resourcing of orthodox and heterodox profes-
sors – especially with postdoctoral staff – is likely to have been even greater in the past: while the av-
erage level of resourcing is decreasing overall (for the economists at the University of Bonn, the rate 
was 4-5 research positions per professor in the 1980s and 1990s; in the more recent past this has been 
considerably reduced to 2-3, by the large-scale introduction of ‘junior’, fixed-term and minimally-
resourced professorships; cf. Heise et al. 2015), the heterodox professors tend to report a slight im-
provement. Of course this development has to be viewed in the light of the above-mentioned zero 
endowment of many heterodox professorships in the founding phase of the reform universities, and a 
subsequent ‘normalization.’ 
51
 Especially important here was, initially, the AK Politische Ökonomie and the Memorandumgruppe, and 
later the research network ‘Alternative Makroökonomik’ and the Keynes-Gesellschaft. 
52
 The Verein für Socialpolitik is historically the (inofficial) professional organisation of academic econo-
mists of the German speaking world.  
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economic or political organizations (e.g. the Wissenschaftsrat – German Council of 
Science and Humanities, or the scientific advisory councils of the German federal 
government or the Deutsche Bundesbank), have remained largely closed to the hetero-
dox economists. Thanks to the nominating rights of the German Trade Unions, a few 
heterodox economists had been delegated to the Sachverständigenrat zur Begutachtung 
der gesamtwirtschaftlichen Entwicklung (SVR, German Council of Economic Experts) 
since it was founded, but here too, their role was that of the outsider (cf. Kampe 1983).  
 
In summary, heterodox economics had to compete with mainstream economics in a very 
‘uneven field of power’. This development is also embedded in the influential model of 
a competitively organized university landscape, in which universities compete with each 
other, as ‘enterprises’, for scarce financial resources. This is why research, today, is not 
defined by a striving for knowledge, but by ‘usability’ (Verwertbarkeit), in the sense of 
the ability to attract external funding. This and (partly as a result of this) the lack of re-
production and consolidation of heterodox structures has exacerbated the ‘unevenness’ 
of the above-mentioned field of power of economics.  
 
 
5. Conclusion 
 
The development of a scientific discipline is dependent on many determinants. As in 
every creative process, idiosyncratic factors within the personality of the individual 
scholar are especially important when it comes to explaining specific innovations or 
insights. A vital role is also played, of course, by the circumstances at the time, the eco-
nomic or social developments that affect the research process – this may take the form 
of an especially urgent problem that requires scholarly examination. But empirical 
anomalies, as we have known since Thomas S. Kuhn, have also frequently changed the 
direction and paradigmatic orientation of a science. Furthermore, distinctive features of 
a discipline must also be taken into account, e.g. the stage of development already 
reached, or the object of study itself. An immature, pre-paradigmatic science seems 
more open to new epistemic processes or methodological approaches than a mature 
science in a paradigmatic state. For example, John Maynard Keynes believed that his 
theory, which he considered revolutionary, would find greater resonance in Germany 
than in his native Great Britain, because he thought that economics in Germany was still 
largely free of theories and paradigms, while he saw the discipline as being caught in a 
state of ‘lock-in’ in Great Britain (cf. Keynes 1973: XXI and XXV). And it is virtually 
unavoidable that sciences whose object of enquiry is a social construct are more ideo-
logically contested than sciences that relate to objective natural phenomena. Some 
sciences (including the social sciences) are therefore unable to fulfil the requirement for 
value-neutrality. Furthermore, the manner in which a society tends and protects its 
underlying instruments (e.g. the market) has an effect on the acceptance of theoretical 
and paradigmatic approaches – quite irrespective of their actual explanatory power (cf. 
Fourcade 2009: 35ff.). The sum of these factors describes what Imre Lakatos described 
as the ‘scientific battlefield.’ Depending on the specific circumstances of the time, 
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idiosyncratic influencing factors, and the specifics of the discipline, this battlefield may 
be characterized by particularly intense interpretive struggles between different research 
programs (Lakatos), or may find itself in the calm waters surrounding a dominant 
hegemon, described by Kuhn as a ‘normal science’. And, lastly, there is one further 
determinant of the development of a scientific discipline: the dispositions in the field of 
the science in question, which must be understood in Bourdieusian terms as a ‘field of 
power,’ in which the various types of capital possessed – economic, social, cultural or 
symbolic – determine the conditions in which the contest on the ‘battlefield’ is fought. 
 
This explanatory background helps to understand the development of economics at the 
beginning of the 20th century: the methodological dispute (Methodenstreit) in Germany 
showed that economics was still in an early state of maturity. The microeconomics-
based equilibrium and welfare theory which was taking shape at the time co-existed 
with classically Marxist approaches and with the still-dominant ‘Historical School’. The 
rise of Keynesianism to (worldwide) prominence in the early post-war period to around 
the mid-20th century cannot be explained without the global economic crisis of the 
1930s, and the special position of John Maynard Keynes as an economist at one of the 
world’s most prestigious universities, a statesman, and the editor of what was at the 
time the most influential economics journal in the still relatively small community of 
economists. But equally, the specific interpretation of Keynesian macroeconomics as an 
outlier of neoclassical equilibrium theory, which had a major influence on the 
professionalization and paradigmatic development of economics, especially in Ger-
many, cannot be explained without the increasing hegemony of American scholarship 
after the Second World War, and the position of Paul Samuelson at an elite US uni-
versity, as well as the massive worldwide success of his textbook, Economics (cf. 
Skousen 1997). Economics had thus developed from a pre-paradigmatic, plural and 
evaluative science (‘advocacy’) to a mono-paradigmatic and positivist one (‘objec-
tivity’). The ‘Keynesian revolution’ was not a scientific revolution, for the simple 
reason that no paradigm had previously been established as a ‘normal science’.53 The 
co-opting of Keynes by general equilibrium theory satisfied the cultural requirements of 
a science whose hegemon could not have legitimated any really fundamental criticism 
of the underlying institutions of its society. It was, however, this very domestication of 
the Keynesian paradigm, and the increasing theoretical criticism of its equilibrium-
centered heuristics, that determined the development of economics in the middle of the 
20th century. The ‘battle of the paradigms’ was influenced by the simultaneous expan-
sion and reform of the universities, a broad social liberation movement, which also 
affected the universities, and dispositifs in the field of power of economics, which were 
linked with economic, social, cultural and symbolic capital. 
 
                                                 
53
 Blaug (1975) confirms the ‘Keynesian revolution’, in the sense that Keynes’ theory had other 
paradigmatic origins than neoclassical theory. Baumberger (1977), however, points out that this is not 
enough to class as a revolution, if the discipline had not yet reached the state of a normal science before 
the ‘new’ theory was developed.  
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The result was, at the beginning of the 1970s, a paradigmatic opening up of economics 
in Germany, which took an extremely uneven course. While the traditional old univer-
sities only appointed heterodox economists by chance, two bastions of heterodox eco-
nomics emerged at the University of Bremen and the Hochschule für Wirtschaft und 
Politik (HWP) in Hamburg. In addition to these, a few newly founded universities – 
especially the ‘comprehensive universities’ in North Rhine-Westphalia and Hesse – and 
a few existing universities, in which reform-oriented status groups were particularly ac-
tive, allowed at least some steps to be taken towards a pluralization of economics. 
However, at no point were more than 10 percent of economics professorships filled by 
heterodox economists. Although heterodox economics quickly developed its own insti-
tutions and networks, by founding organizations and journals, the following 40 years 
saw an overall marginalization of heterodoxy in Germany. This was also reflected in the 
overlooking of heterodox economists during the restaffing of East German economics 
departments after the unification of Germany. The following factors must be taken into 
account here: 
 
1. The number of heterodox research programs represented in German universities, 
especially in the 1980s, does not suggest that heterodoxy became quantitatively in-
significant because its approaches were beaten on the ‘battlefield of the paradigms’. 
Moreover, empirical anomalies – such as the increasingly permanent presence of un-
employment despite increasing flexibilization of the labor markets (cf. Heise/Kromp-
hardt/Priewe 1998) – remained significant enough to encourage the continuing search 
for alternative explanations (within, but also outside the mainstream).  
 
2. German economics surrendered completely to the hegemony of American economics 
after the Second World War. On the one hand, this was intended to offset actual deficits 
caused by the exodus of important scholars and the country’s isolation during the Nazi 
period. On the other hand, German economics could not escape the hegemonic claims to 
standardization asserted by certain elite US universities and their journals. Even today, 
this ‘(self-) Americanization’ lingers on under the catchphrase ‘international compet-
itiveness’, which is thought to preclude specific national paths (Sonderwege) – or 
national scientific cultures. Under these conditions, the marginalization of heterodox 
economics in the US had to be seen as, at least, a limiting parameter for developments 
in Germany.  
  
3. Heterodoxy and the mainstream coexisted, without any acknowledgement of hetero-
doxy by the mainstream or any extensive penetration of the mainstream by heterodoxy. 
This non-acknowledgement is manifested in the long-standing refusal to admit plural-
istic reform universities to the DFG, the ongoing denial of decision-making positions in 
DFG committees to heterodox economists, the general impossibility of accessing finan-
cial resources from the DFG, and the severely restricted access to publishing opportu-
nities in journals which promise a high level of recognition, and which are supposedly 
not affiliated to any school. This denial of recognition became a standardized, institu-
tionalized part of the allocation of university resources during the transition of univer-
Heise/Thieme: What happened to heterodox economics after the 1970s 
23 
 
sity governance from committee-led to competitive universities, thus making this margi-
nalization virtually automatic, and above all, legitimizing it. The failure of heterodoxy 
to penetrate the mainstream is shown in the refusal of many heterodox economists to 
accept organizations such as the Verein für Socialpolitik (VfS) as representatives of the 
economics community with no paradigmatic affiliations. It should be mentioned, 
though, that the distribution of the heterodox VfS members over the committees of the 
VfS (the vast majority are members of the committee on the history of economic 
thought) suggests that the specific rite of admission to the VfS imposed clear restric-
tions on access to the core areas of the VfS, i.e. the committees for theory and economic 
policy, and was therefore also an instrument for denying recognition. 
 
4. The reproduction of heterodox economists remained well below the average. The 
reason for this was the below-average number of positions available for junior 
researchers (Qualifikationsstellen), and the severe restrictions on access to DFG re-
sources. But the orientation of many heterodox economists, who preferred to have an 
influence on society (through research transfer) than on the academic community 
(through research), is also likely to have played a part. The recruitment process in the 
economics faculties of East German universities after the German unification makes it 
clear, however, that it is not only the below-average reproduction of heterodoxy – i.e. a 
problem of supply –, but also the very much below-average level of recruitment – i.e. a 
problem of demand – that have to be taken into account as important factors. 
 
5. Due to the special significance of the University of Bremen and the HWP for the 
development of heterodoxy, their specific circumstances have to be examined. These 
show the same thing that has happened, so far, to all attempts to influence traditional 
economics with a new orientation: in the end, the denial of recognition by the academic 
community led to a loss of political-social support and, ultimately, to the dissolution or 
at least total marginalization of the heterodox academic unit. In the case of the Univer-
sity of Bremen, the economics department was actually abandoned as a unit for teaching 
undergraduate economics,54 and in the case of the HWP, the loss of institutional 
autonomy led to a forced adaptation to the mainstream.  
 
The representatives of heterodox economics did not succeed in establishing plurali-
zation as part of the ‘cultural capital’ of the German community of economists, and 
were thus unable to claim recognition for the heuristic divergence of their own para-
digmatic approach in relation to the mainstream focus on self-regulation. Their chances 
of winning the ‘battle of the paradigms’ were hopeless, given their vast inferiority in 
terms of every kind of capital: economic (professorships and the associated positions for 
junior researchers, access to financial resources from the DFG etc.), social (networks 
                                                 
54
 Even in the mid-1970s, the reformist orientation of the University of Bremen lost its political and social 
support, after the DFG had refused to accept the university into its ranks, and the financial problems of 
the federal state of Bremen had forced the university to rely more on external funding. This was felt 
especially keenly by the department of economics, where business studies (Betriebswirtschaftslehre) 
was promoted and expanded at the expense of (macro)economics (Volkswirtschaftslehre) (cf. Heise et 
al. 2015: 338ff.).    
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based on VfS membership, editorial boards of journals, influential scholarly organiza-
tions such as scientific advisory committees of federal ministries, boards of reviewers of 
the DFG etc.) and symbolic (presidents of important economic research institutes, mem-
bers of scientific advisory boards in federal ministries, members of the SVR (German 
Council of Economic Experts), etc.). Nor were they able to prevent the establishment of 
scientific standards55 which systematically belittled the value of heterodox economics, 
thus perpetuating the marginalization of heterodoxy and ensuring the monistic ideali-
zation of the mainstream. In short, the setting of paradigmatic standards has been used 
to close the academic system, after previous attempts to close it by means of socio-
structural attributions had failed due to the sudden expansion of the universities in the 
early 1970s. 
 
                                                 
55
 In particular, this means the value and weighting ascribed to funding sources and journals, to create 
‘objective’ rankings for the evaluation of scientific ‘quality.’ 
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